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AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH FOR EVALUATING INVESTMENT RISK: 
 





Roy’s safety-first rule is used to provide measures popular with farmers of short and long term 
business risk associated with various no-till transition strategies over an investment horizon.  The 
short run rule provided more sensitivity to inter-year financial risk than other commonly used 
criteria.  Results revealed that speed of adoption influenced the probability of successful 
transition more than did the sequence of drill acquisition methods.  Higher equity and larger farms 
had a greater chance of transition success. Slow acreage expansion with a custom or rental drill 
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AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH FOR EVALUATING INVESTMENT RISK: AN 
APPLICATION TO THE NO-TILL TRANSITION 
 
Despite considerable methodological progress in the past (Buschena and Zilberman), there 
has been concern that standard risk analytical methods including expected utility/stochastic 
dominance have not been practical for agricultural extension use (Just and Rausser; Selley and 
Wilson; Anderson and Mapp).  Castle cited a need to fill a “communication gap” between farm 
managers and risk analysts.  A survey by Selley and Wilson indicate that many producers want to 
know specific strategies and probabilities of success or failure.  Safety-first rules, which explicitly 
consider probability of experiencing an unfavorable outcome, have been recognized as a viable 
alternative (Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson; Dillon and Anderson; Buschena and Zilberman).  
Among the three variants of the safety-first rule (Katoka; Telser; Roy), Roy’s rule which 
minimizes the probability of falling below a critical level of net cash flow is the simplest.  
Telser’s and Katoka’s rules require potentially challenging elicitation of safety constraints and do 
not report performance as a simple probability of adverse outcome.  Selley and Wilson reported 
that “expected frequencies/probabilities,” as in Roy’s rule, ranked number one in a survey of 229 
extension and research faculty as their preferred tools in risk education programs.  Among the risk 
education tools evaluated in the survey, expected utility and stochastic dominance ranked much 
lower in communicating risk information to farmers and ranchers.  Indeed, even faculty with 
predominantly research appointments reported probabilities as their favored communication tool 
in outreach work.   
Risky decisions regarding large infrequent investments in land and machinery have the 
greatest impacts on firm survival, but critics have argued that standard risk analytical techniques 
are most deficient in this multi-year setting (Just; Kingwell, Pannell and Robinson).   In the past,   4
whole-farm  multi-year cash flow simulations have been used to illustrate the effects of 
investment risk; however, these studies often relied on expected or stochastic ending net present 
value (NPV) or ending net worth as the objective function (Held and Helmers; Richardson and 
Condra; Lien). These criteria exclude farmers who may be averse to fluctuations in cash flow 
within the investment period.  
  In this study of a risky multi year transition to no-till farming in eastern Washington, 
annual net cash flow is a key performance variable.   Failure to meet annual cash requirements 
(including family living and debt payments) during any year or sequence of years of the transition 
could precipitate forced refinancing, erosion of equity or even bankruptcy.  Many early adopters 
of no-till in the study region subsequently abandoned the practice in part due to difficulties in 
managing the large investment costs of acquiring a no-till drill.  Others indicated that fear of 
investment risk was a major barrier to no-till adoption (Juergens et al.).   However, surveys 
showed that no-till can boost profits in this region if the transition to no-till is navigated 
successfully (Camara, Young, and Hinman).   
The objective of this study is to rank several no-till transition strategies for farmers who 
follow short term and long term safety-first decision criteria.  These rankings are compared to 
those for a risk neutral criterion.  Recent Monte Carlo simulation techniques are used to model the 
sequence of net cash flows for different transition strategies and farm types.   A better 
understanding of the economic viability of different no-till transition strategies could hopefully 
accelerate adoption of no-till where it is suitable, and thereby reduce the economic and 
environmental losses from soil erosion.  The illustration of multi-year risk criteria which are 
sensitive to sequence of cash flows as well as terminal investment performance may be useful in 
other risky investment applications. 
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Model and Assumptions 
  The Simetar farm simulation program (Richardson; Richardson, Klose and Gray) will be 
used to describe stochastic returns of eastern Washington wheat-barley-pea farms of different 
sizes and equity structures for different no-till transition strategies.  The diversified wheat-barley-
pea rotation has proven successful for no-till in this annual cropping region as it inhibits diseases 
and weeds (F. Young et al.).  The farm’s annual net after tax cash flow will be stochastically 
simulated for 500 “draws” from risky weather and prices for each of the years of a six-year 
transition to no-till farming.  The risk modeling exercise for each of 104 farm type-strategy 
combinations yields 3000 (500 draws x 6 years) simulated annual net cash flows.  This generates 
a total of 312,000 annual economic farm cash flow performances.  To reflect the “learning curve” 
for no-till in the region, expected yields will be assumed to suffer a 10% penalty relative to 
conventional tillage in year one which linearly disappears by year six.  Prior to imposition of the 
penalty no-till mean yields were standardized to the conventional mean, but variances retained 
their empirical patterns.   
Recent farm simulation models have focused on incorporating inter and intra-temporal 
correlations of yield and prices (Richardson, Klose and Gray; Ramirez and Somarriba).  
Following Richardson, Klose and Gray, the intra-temporal correlation matrix for  it X  to  jt X will 
be derived as: 
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where  it, e  are the residual from each random variable (prices and yields) i X  and each year ‘t’.     6
Inter-temporal correlation matrix for variable  it X  to  1 - it X will be derived as (Richardson, 
Klose and Gray): 
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) and prices (P
~
) are generated from a multivariate empirical 
distribution.  Assuming the data are distributed empirically avoids enforcing specific distributions 
and permits incorporating observed correlations (Richardson, Klose and Gray).  The procedure 
utilizes the inverse transformation method of imposing these inter and intra-temporal correlation 
matrices to standard normal deviates (Law and Kelton).  The resulting distributions will reflect 
skewness and other non-normal patterns in the empirical data.   
Farm budgets will be prepared, using stochastic yield and prices, to generate net cash 
flows (S) for each year t of the six-year no-till transition of 104 farm type-strategy combinations 
(4 farm types by 26 transition strategies) as follows: 
(3)           F T G L E Y P St       
~ ~ ~ ~
*
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) (    
Where, E = Cash expenses for crop production, land and machinery payments, property taxes, 
insurance and overhead.  Crop production expenses will be allowed to inflate by 3% per annum. 
L
~
 = Landlord’s crop share on rented land set at one-third for grain and one-fourth for peas less 
proportionate contribution for crop insurance and fertilizers. 
G
~
 = Net government payments received which are the sum of direct, loan program, and counter 
cyclical payments of the 2002 farm bill, as eligible, less the landlord’s proportionate share of 
government payments.  
T
~
= Income tax paid by the farmer as a function of annual before tax income.   7
F = Family living withdrawals of $17,118 to $32,073 per year which are positively correlated 
with farm size and equity and inflate by 3% per year. 
Cash flow surpluses or deficits from previous years are permitted to adjust net cash flow in 
current year.  Within the transition period, the farmer receives 6% interest on any cash reserve 
and pays 8% loan interest to finance a cash deficit.  
Four types of modeled farms include a large size of 3000 acres and a small size of 800 
acres combined with a high (low) equity levels of 80% (20%).  Equity percent corresponds with 
fully paid owned acreage.  The remainder is assumed rented.  Twenty six no-till transition 
strategies represent 13 drill acquisition sequences from purchasing, renting and/or custom hiring a 
drill over the six-year transition period combined with two (immediate and gradual) speeds of no-
till adoption over the farm acreage.  With immediate adoption, the farmer no-tills 100% of the 
acreage from year 1 to year 6. With gradual adoption the farmer no-tills 5% of acreage in the first 
year and adds 5% each year until the sixth year when 30% of farm acreage is no-tilled.  The 
farmer is assumed to pay $53,750 for the no-till drill with a required 30% down payment and the 
balance amortized over the next five years at 8% interest.  Rental and custom hire rates are set at 
$12 and $20 per acre, respectively.   
The probability of no-till transition failure (TF), consistent with Roy’s safety first rule, is 
derived as:  
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Where   Z are the elements of an Mx1 vector Z, for each farm type-strategy combination (26 x 4 = 
104) and M = 500.   Z gets 1 if transition failed (depending on definition), 0 otherwise. 
  A short run “transition failure” will be defined as two consecutive years of negative cash 
flow.  This definition means the farmer fails to meet production expenses, debt payments, and 
family living from current year’s crop revenues, reserves, and government payments for two years 
in a row.  In agriculture, variable incomes are expected so most growers are considered unlikely 
to “give up on no-till” after just one year’s cash flow shortfall.  But growers with a moderate 
degree of risk aversion are assumed to be unwilling or unable to see the investment through its   8
complete six-year course if a cash flow shortfall occurs over two consecutive years.  In the short 
run, transition failure for any draw m (out of M draws) of a farm type-strategy combination (out 
of 104) will be computed as:  
 (4)     1    Z   if  )] 0 ( ) 0 [( / ,......, / )], 0 ( ) 0 [( 1 2 1      mt mt m m S and S or and or and S and S  
           0  otherwise. 
  
For each farm type-strategy combination, there will be different matrix of net cash flow (S) with 
M =500 rows and t =6 columns as shown below: 
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In contrast, “transition failure” in a long run sense is defined as experiencing a negative 
present value of net cash flow (PVNCF) over the six-year transition period.  This criterion may 
appeal to farmers who have comparatively strong financial situation and/or are willing to endure 
the full six years to assess the probability that PVNCF is positive.  For each draw m for a farm 
type-strategy combination, the “transition failure” in long run sense is calculated as:   





































                       0 otherwise.  
Smt is the net cashflow for the m
th draw, r is the discount rate, and t is the transition year.    
Data 
Historic crop price patterns were used to project multivariate price distributions for wheat, 
barley and peas.  Trends in average crop prices over the transition period were based on localized 
national forecasts (Michell and Black).  However, due to absence of national forecast   9
mechanisms, pea prices were forecasted linearly from historical Washington state prices (WASS).  
Price variability on peas was generated from historical marketing year average price in the state. 
Crop enterprise expenses were based on a survey of no-till farms in the region (Camara, Young, 
and Hinman).     
  Multivariate yield distributions for conventional and no-till wheat, barley, and peas was 
based on annual yields of these crops in a 9-year eastern Palouse field experiment (Boerboom et 
al.; Hall; Young, Kwon, and Young).  The experiment utilized large plots that permitted use of 
typical-size machinery and cultural practices.  Table 1 shows nine-year mean yields of 
conventional tillage winter wheat (86.08 bu/ac), spring barley (83.57 bu/ac) and spring peas 
(16.89 cwt/ac).  The yields are similar to those on well managed farms in the region (Young, F. et 
al.).  Use of site rather than regional average data should better reflect farm-level yield variability 
(Debrah and Hall).  Winter wheat yields were slightly negatively skewed.  Spring barley and 
spring peas were positively skewed.  The coefficient of variation (CV) showed that conventional 
crop yields were more variable than the no-till yields (Table 1).  Conventional tilled spring pea 
had the highest CV (39.10%), followed by conventional tilled spring barley (35.11%), and 
conventional tilled winter wheat (28.38%). Although CV’s of prices were less than those for 
yields; wheat price CV was 17.47%, barley was 13.76% and pea was 14.15%. 
The price and yield correlation matrix (Table 1) shows that all variables except spring pea 
price were intra-temporally correlated with one or more variables at 5% level of significance.  
Not surprisingly, significant and high correlation was observed between no-till and conventional 
tilled spring pea yield (0.97), spring barley yield (0.97) and winter wheat yield (0.92).  Winter 
wheat and spring barley yield showed high correlation under conventional tillage (0.92) than 
under no-till (0.70).  The correlation between conventional winter wheat and no-till spring barley 
yields was 0.85.  The correlation between conventional spring barley and no-till winter wheat was   10
0.82. Prices were not significantly correlated with own yields, but wheat price had high and 
significant correlation with barley price (0.80). 
The inter-temporal correlation matrix (Table 1) shows moderately high and negative 
correlation for spring pea no-till (-0.52) and conventional till (-0.62) yields.  Spring barley yields 
were positively correlated (0.38).  Among prices, spring barley had comparatively higher inter-
temporal correlation (0.38) compared to spring peas (-0.25) or winter wheat (-0.04).   
Results 
  Table 2 shows the probability of transition failure for four farm types across 26 transition 
strategies employing a short term “two consecutive years of negative net cash flow” criterion.  
The 26 no-till transition strategies represent all combinations between two speeds of no-till 
acreage adoption and thirteen sequences in which a no-till drill is acquired via custom hiring, 
renting, and/or purchasing.  The strategies are defined in the footnote accompanying Table 2.   
  For a given farm type, risk of short run transition failure is higher for immediate adoption 
compared to gradual adoption.  For example, for a large farm with 80% owned land, the 
probability of transition failure ranged from 0.09-0.11 under gradual adoption.  But, it ranged 
from 0.18-0.33 under immediate adoption. The higher transition risk of immediate adoption is 
attributable to the initial 10% yield penalty for no-till. As shown in Table 1, no-till actually had 
slightly lower yield variance than conventional tillage in the 9-year data set, but this advantage 
was offset by the yield penalty in early years. 
  As expected, the low equity farm exhibits higher risk of short run transition failure for a 
given size.  For example, the mean probability of failure for the large farm with 20% owned land 
ranged from 0.42 to 0.68 across speeds of adoption, while that for the large farm with 80% owned 
land ranged from 0.10 to 0.25.  This difference is attributed to additional outlay for land rental 
payments for the low equity farm.    11
  As shown in Table 2, speed of no-till adoption over farm acreage tends to dominate 
acquisition sequence in terms of short run transition risk.  For a large farm, choice of transition 
strategy is more important under immediate adoption than gradual adoption.  For example, the 
large farm showed higher mean probability of transition failure (0.25-0.68) across equity levels 
and transition strategies for immediate adoption compared to gradual adoption (0.10-0.42).  For 
the small farm, choice of transition strategy is also relatively more risky under immediate 
adoption. Again, the initial yield penalty with no-till increases the risk of immediate adoption. 
  Table 3 is similar in format to Table 2.  However, a longer term measure of risk is used, 
namely a negative PVNCF over the entire six-year transition period.  As expected, risk of failure 
was higher for immediate adoption compared to gradual adoption for a given farm type.  For 
example, the large farm with 80% owned land experienced probability of failure ranging from 
0.02-0.14 over strategies with a mean of 0.07 for immediate adoption compared to a range of 0-
0.01 and mean of 0.01 under gradual adoption.  Similar patterns, but higher risk levels, prevail for 
low equity large farms and for small farms. 
   As expected, the results in Tables 2 and 3 reveal that the long term PVNCF criterion 
shows lower risk of failure for most transition strategies.  For example, the large farm with 80% 
owned land under immediate adoption showed a long run probability of transition failure of 0.02-
0.14 over strategies compared to 0.18-0.33 for the short run probabilities.  The small farm with 
80% rented land under immediate adoption was an exception.  In general, negative PVNCF 
implies more patience over time for a sequence of negative annual cash flows than the two-
consecutive-year criterion.  But in the small equity farm, some exceptionally large negative cash 
flows, not always in sequence, accounts for the high risk under the negative PVNCF criterion. 
  Both decision criteria produced generally consistent results in identifying minimum or 
maximum risk strategies (Tables 2 and 3).  Interestingly, immediate purchase of a drill was less   12
risky than custom hiring or renting for large farms immediately placing 100% acreage under no-
till.  The reason is that economies of size made purchasing cheaper than custom or rental.  In 
contrast, renting a no-till drill for the entire transition period was less risky than custom hiring or 
buying for all small farms and for large farms under gradual adoption.  Custom hiring for the 
entire transition period was the most risky for large farms under immediate adoption, but for 
small farms some combinations of custom hire and purchase were the most risky transition 
strategies.  These results follow from the fact that custom hire and renting expenses increase 
linearly with acreage whereas the fixed costs associated with a purchased drill decrease with 
acreage.  Custom hiring incurs cash outflows for labor, but no cash cost is incurred for operator’s 
labor for rental or purchased drills.  
  Table 4 shows mean present value of net cash flow (over 500 simulations) for twenty six 
transition strategies for four farm types.  Not surprisingly given initial yield penalties, gradual 
adoption shows higher PVNCF than immediate adoption.  For example, in the case of the large 
farm with 80% owned land, gradual adoption returned mean annual net cash flow ranging from 
$457,800 to $488,400 where as immediate adoption returned only $197,300 to $314,500. 
  Figure 1 plots the tradeoff between probability of transition failure against mean PVNCF 
for pure purchase, rent and custom hire transition strategies for a large high equity farm.  Not 
surprisingly, probability of transition failure declines directly with mean PVNCF under both 
decision criteria.  The slope of the curve in Figure 1 is downward in contrast to most annual risk/ 
return tradeoff curves.  In annual tradeoff curves for financial investments or farm plans, higher 
expected returns generally require bearing additional risk (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson; 
Robison and Barry).  However, for the multi-year analysis, both probability of failure and final 
PVNCF are dependent upon the performance of the series of the annual cash flows.  This business 
cash flow perspective will generally lead to a negative correlation between mean PVNCF and   13
probability of failure.  “Risk dominant” strategies occur at the lower right of Figure 1.  Gradual 
(G) no-till adoption dominates in Figure 1 for this problem.  In contrast, immediate adoption 
strategies are less profitable and display higher probability of failure.  For the large high equity 
farm in Figure 1 with gradual adoption, six-year drill rental (GR-6) and custom hire (GC-6) are 
risk-return dominant among the “pure” acquisition strategies displayed.  Also, as explained 
earlier, the probability of transition failure is smaller under the long term PVNCF criterion than 
the under the short term criterion.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
  This study proposed two cash flow based performance criteria related to investment risk 
that are likely to be of interest to farmers.  Both measures use Roy’s safety-first criterion which 
minimizes the probability of net cash flow falling below a critical level.  The first or short run 
measure may appeal to farmers who are averse to certain sequences of annual cash flows within 
the investment horizon.  A longer run measure evaluates the probability of experiencing a 
negative PVNCF over the six-year transition period. Based on the responses of surveyed 
extension and research economists, these probability-based measures supply the type of 
information that farmers and ranchers understand and desire (Selley and Wilson).  
  The proposed short run risk decision criterion provides potential advantages over expected 
utility and stochastic dominance criteria in that it permits aversion to the sequence of outcomes 
within the investment period, rather than only to terminal summary measures such as present 
value or equity as in past studies (Held and Helmers; Richardson and Condra; Lien).  Despite the 
use of ending farm equity as the sole risky farm performance measure in a stochastic dominance 
analysis, Lien acknowledged the importance of sequential outcomes in the investment period by 
noting that “a couple of bad years in production and an unexpected rise in interest rates can send 
the business bankrupt” (p. 399).   Mossin, and Spence and Zeckhauser have also pointed out that   14
expected utility models encounter theoretical inconsistency in dynamic problems because the 
timing of uncertainty resolution within the period may lead to violations of the independence 
axiom of expected utility.    
  Several generalizations and recommendations for managing (and surviving) the no-till 
transitions emerge from the simulation results.  Regardless of farm type, speed of adoption has a 
larger effect on navigating the no-till transition successfully than does the drill acquisition 
method.  This implies that if a farmer is still learning to make no-till work, it is wise to go slow in 
acreage expansion.  Low equity farmers have the lowest probability of successfully navigating the 
no-till transition while financing a drill.  Farmers renting a high proportion of their cropland may 
want to wait until they can pay cash for a (possibly lower cost) no-till drill.  Custom and rental 
drill acquisition in early years of the transition is recommended for small farmers, especially if 
they are expanding no-till acreage gradually.     
  Farmer’s choice of decision criteria will also depend on the financial position of the farm. 
High equity farms may be more likely to have the risk tolerance to maximize long run PVNCF. 
However, short tem and long term criteria converged in the selection of transition strategies for 
many situations.   
  Earlier survey results from small samples of farmers in the region who were in the no-till 
transition, or had completed it, support the sequential nature of the transition process (Juergens et 
al.; Camara, Young and Hinman).  Most transition farmers, who generally had medium or large 
farms, custom hired or rented a drill in years 1-3, but many had purchased a drill by years 4 and 5.  
Personal adoption histories varied considerably indicating that adoption plans must be 
strategically tailored to the particular farm business situation as in this study.   
  This study was intended to provide practical decision criteria for risky investments.  
Farmers and other businessmen will benefit from practical models for managing investment risk.    15
Decisions on large long term investments will often have the greatest bearing on firm survival.   
Of course, the results of this particular no-till transition study are influenced by the assumptions 
of the example farm situation.  Application of the methods to other technologies or to other 
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Table 1. Intra/Inter-Temporal Correlations and Summary Statistics of Experiment Yields and 
Prices of Winter Wheat, Spring Barley and Spring Pea in Whitman County, WA, 1986-1994 
  Intra-temporal Correlation of Yield and Prices  
  NWW  NSB NSP CWW  CSB CSP PWW  PSB PSP 
NWW  1  0.70* 0.07  0.92* 0.82* 0.23  -0.35 -0.19 -0.09 
NSB   1 0.18  0.85*  0.97*  0.26  -0.43  -0.45  -0.13 
NSP      1  0.01 0.11 0.97*  0.03 -0.10  0.41 
CWW     1  0.92*  0.14  -0.60  -0.44  -0.06 
CSB      1  0.21  -0.45  -0.45  -0.22 
CSP       1  0.03  -0.04  0.40 
PWW        1  0.80*  -0.32 
PSB         1  0.01 




-0.20  0.38 -0.52  0.00 0.38 -0.62  -0.04  0.38 -0.25 
Mean 
b  86.08 83.57 16.89 86.08 83.57 16.89 3.39  2.15  9.02 
CV  25.72 35.08 36.77 28.38 35.11 39.10 17.47 13.76 14.15 
Min  52.82 35.95 7.63  49.07 42.52 7.69  2.51  1.63  7.60 
Median  87.06 79.43 15.58 90.3  75.52 15.91 3.45  2.24  9.00 
Max  113.0 138.3 25.3  127.8 138.7 27.3  4.1  2.5  12.1 
a One-year correlations.  
b  Mean restricted to the level of conventional tillage.  
* is significant at 5% level (t-critical = 2.36).  
Note: WW is winter wheat (bu), SB is spring barley (bu) and SP is spring pea (cwt). Yield in per 
acre and prices in $/unit. First letter N signifies no-till, C signifies conventional tillage and P 
signifies price. 
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Table 2.  Probability of Two Consecutive Years of Negative Cash Flows Within a Six-Year 




80% Own Land 
Large Farm 
20% Own Land 
Small Farm 
80% Own Land 
Small Farm 
20% Own Land 
  Imm Grad Imm Grad Imm Grad  Imm Grad 
P-6  0.18 0.10 0.57 0.44 0.48 0.35  0.89 0.76 
R-1  0.19 0.10 0.59 0.44 0.53 0.38  0.91 0.76 
R-2  0.21 0.11 0.63 0.42 0.51 0.32  0.91 0.77 
R-3  0.23 0.10 0.66 0.42 0.50 0.31  0.91 0.74 
R-4  0.24 0.10 0.69 0.42 0.49 0.29  0.89 0.74 
R-5  0.26 0.09 0.70 0.41 0.46 0.23  0.88 0.63 
R-6  0.26 0.09 0.71 0.40 0.44 0.19  0.86 0.58 
C-1  0.20 0.10 0.60 0.45 0.54 0.38  0.92 0.76 
C-2  0.24 0.11 0.67 0.42 0.54 0.32  0.92 0.77 
C-3  0.28 0.10 0.71 0.42 0.54 0.32  0.93 0.74 
C-4  0.30 0.10 0.76 0.43 0.54 0.29  0.92 0.74 
C-5  0.32 0.09 0.78 0.42 0.52 0.24  0.91 0.64 
C-6  0.33 0.09 0.79 0.41 0.51 0.20  0.90 0.59 
Mean  0.25 0.10 0.68 0.42 0.51 0.29  0.90 0.71 
CV  19.10  6.52 10.36  3.27 6.27 21.10 2.07 9.85 
Note: Grad = Gradual speed of adoption (5%,10%,15%,20%,25%,30% of crop area no-tilled from 
1-6 years) and Imm = Immediate adoption (100% in all 6 years). x-i are the drill acquisition 
sequences where x denotes option (P = purchase, R = rent and C = custom hire) and i denotes the 
number of years the option was used within a six year period. Remaining 6-i years the drill was 












   21
Table 3.  Probability of Negative Present Value of Six-Year Net Cash Flows for Four Farm Types 




80% own land 
Large farm 
20% own land 
Small farm 
80% own land 
Small farm 
20% own land 
  Imm Grad Imm Grad Imm Grad Imm Grad 
P-6  0.02 0.01 0.48 0.24 0.28 0.10 0.91 0.65 
R-1  0.03 0.01 0.53 0.21 0.34 0.11 0.94 0.66 
R-2  0.04 0.01 0.59 0.21 0.33 0.08 0.94 0.62 
R-3  0.04 0.01 0.62 0.20 0.31 0.05 0.93 0.58 
R-4  0.06 0.00 0.65 0.19 0.29 0.04 0.92 0.52 
R-5  0.07 0.00 0.67 0.18 0.27 0.03 0.91 0.46 
R-6  0.08 0.00 0.68 0.17 0.22 0.02 0.87 0.37 
C-1  0.04 0.01 0.57 0.21 0.38 0.11 0.96 0.66 
C-2  0.05 0.01 0.63 0.21 0.37 0.08 0.96 0.62 
C-3  0.08 0.01 0.68 0.20 0.38 0.06 0.96 0.59 
C-4  0.10 0.01 0.72 0.20 0.37 0.04 0.96 0.53 
C-5  0.11 0.01 0.77 0.19 0.36 0.04 0.95 0.47 
C-6  0.14 0.00 0.78 0.18 0.32 0.02 0.93 0.38 
Mean  0.07 0.01 0.64 0.20 0.33 0.06 0.93 0.55 
CV  50.51 21.64 13.69 8.54  15.17 53.20 2.75  18.65 
Note: Grad = Gradual speed of adoption (5%,10%,15%,20%,25%,30% of crop area no-tilled from 
1-6 years) and Imm = Immediate adoption (100% in all 6 years). x-i are the drill acquisition 
sequences where x denotes option (P = purchase, R = rent and C = custom hire) and i denotes the 
number of years the option was used within a six year period. Remaining 6-i years the drill was 
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Table 4.  Mean Present Value of After Tax Net Cash Flows (‘00$) across Twenty Six No-till 




80% own land 
Large farm 
20% own land 
Small farm 
80% own land 
Small farm 
20% own land 
  Imm Grad Imm Grad Imm Grad Imm Grad 
P-6  3145 4578 23  1248 307  755  -594 -220 
R-1  3016 4679 -133 1348 213  736  -703 -249 
R-2  2867 4725 -298 1405 233  811  -679 -164 
R-3  2735 4767 -444 1453 258  886  -651 -81 
R-4  2620 4802 -575 1491 288  959  -620 -2 
R-5  2519 4831 -692 1522 323  1033 -583 77 
R-6  2454 4884 -767 1581 394  1140 -507 192 
C-1  2917 4674 -245 1343 183  734  -734 -251 
C-2  2677 4712 -512 1391 176  807  -740 -168 
C-3  2462 4743 -753 1426 176  878  -740 -90 
C-4  2270 4764 -971 1449 182  947  -733 -15 
C-5  2098 4776 -1167  1461 196  1016 -719 59 
C-6  1973 4812 -1311  1499 249  1117 -663 167 
Note: Grad = Gradual speed of adoption (5%,10%,15%,20%,25%,30% of crop area no-tilled from 
1-6 years) and Imm = Immediate adoption (100% in all 6 years). x-i are the drill acquisition 
sequences where x denotes option (P = purchase, R = rent and C = custom hire) and i denotes the 
number of years the option was used within a six year period. Remaining 6-i years the drill was 
purchased. 80% and 20% refer to percentage of land owned rather than rented. 80% and 20% 
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Note: I = immediate adoption and G = gradual adoption; P = purchase, R= rent, and C= custom 
hire options; 6 means the option is used for all six years in the transition period. For example: IC-
6 means farmer used custom hired drill on all land for the entire period.  
 
Figure 1.  Trade-off Between Probability of Transition Failure and Mean Present Value of Net 
Cash Flow for Six Pure Transition Strategies Under Two Decision Criteria for A Large Farm 
With 80% Owned Land  
 